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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of taxation and inflation in determining
the market valuation of corporate capital and the level of investment. It
extends previous work on the q theory of investment by incorporating the
effects of taxes levied at the individual level and by focusing on the
impact of inflation. The q theoretic approach makes it possible to study
the effect of policy announcements and of temporary policies. The
resulting model of the investment process is immune from the "Lucas
critique". The estimated relationships are technological and independent
of the choice of policy rule.
The empirical results indicate that tax policy and inflation have
potent effects on both the stock market and investment. These effects
depend critically on whether or not policy is announced in advance.
Simulations based on q investment equations indicate that an increase in
the rate of inflation from 0 to 8 percent would cause an immediate 23
percent decline in the stock market, and a 35 percent increase in the
capital stock. Changes in tax policy also have a large effect. The
estimated speed of adjustment of the capital stock is surprisingly slow,
with less than half the adjustment occurring within 10 years following
typical shocks.






The last decade has witnessed a striking decline
in the market valuation of corporate capital. In 1967,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood at 1600 expressed
in today's dollars compared to 800 as this is written. As
theory would predict, the reduction in the valuation of
existing corporate assets .has retarded investment. Indeed,
the rate of growth of the non-financial corporate capital
stock has fallen considerably from 4.8 percent during the
19.60."5 to 3.9. pe+:cent during the 1970's. This paper ex-
amines the extent to which the interaction of inflation
and taxation can account for these phenomena. It also
provides an alternative to the traditional econometric
framework for estimating the effects on investment and
the stock. market of changes in corporate and individual
tax rules.
The dependence of aggregate investment on the level
of the stock market has been widely recognized. As Tobin
argued, increases in the return to capital will raise the
market value of existing capital signaling the profitability
of additional investment. Additional investment will drive
down the marginal product of capital, reducing the asset-2-
price of capital goods until equilibrium is restored. While
models linking the stock market to investment have been
estimated, they have not been used to examine the impact
of economic policies on investment. This paper develops
a method of using investment equations based on stock market
valuation to evaluate the effects of changes in capital
income taxes. The model relies on the assumption that the
stock market valuation of corporate capital represents the
present value of its future profit stream. By calculating
the effects of tax changes on future profits their impact
on the stock market is estimated. This is used as a basis
for estimates of their effect on corporate capital accumula-
tion.
This approach has several advantages when compared
to previous empirical approaches to modelling investment.
Almost all previous evaluations of tax policy's impact on
investment have relied on single equation models linking
investment to its proximate determinants, usually output and
the cost of capital. For the most part, individual taxes
have been ignored and the process of adjustment has been
handled in an ad hoc fashion. Most critically, existing
approaches to modelling investment decisions are subject
to the "Lucas criticism". The estimated parameters are not
likely to be invariant to the choice of policy rules~ The
equations thus do not provide a busis for estimating the-3-
true effects of changes in policy rules. This failing is
seen by considering the effect on investment of a tax change
announced in year 1, which will take effect in year 2.
Standard "backward looking" investment equations imply that
such announcements have no immediate impact on investment.
The general theoretical approach developed here makes use
of the fact that stock market valuation reflects expectation
of future policies as well as the effects of taxes levied
at the individual level. It can be used to assess a richer
variety of tax changes than are normally considered.
The results suggesi that changes in inflation and
tax rules have very important effects on capital accumulation
and asset prices. However, because adjustment costs appear
to be substantial, the effects of tax policy on investment
are slow to manifest themselves. For example, the results
suggest that the elimination of capital gains taxes would
raise the ultimate capital stock by 29 percent, but raise the
capital stock by only 4 percent within five years. It appears,
however, that the interaction of inflation and taxation can account
for a significant fraction of the decline in the stock market
and capital formation which has occurred during the 1970's.
The second section of the paper outlines a "q" model
of investment and uses it to examine the dynamics of market-4-
valuation and capital accumulation. The effects of intro-
ducing a simple tax system are considered.
The third section of the paper considers explicitly
the optimization problem of a value maximizing firm in the
presence of taxation and adjustment costs. It is shown that
the optimal investment decision at any point in time can be
written as a simple function of the firm's market value,
its capital stock and the tax parameters. The results of
estimating this "tax adjusted q" investment equation are
reported in section four. This section also discusses the
estimation of the other parameters of the model. The fifth
section of the paper uses the estimates developed in the
previous section to examine the effect of increases in infla-
tion on capital accumulation and taxation. It is shown that
the non-indexed character of the tax system can account for
a large part of the decline in the stock market and investment
which has taken place over the last decade. The likely effects
of continued inflation on capital accumulation are also
examined, along with the effects of indexing the tax system.
Estimates of the effects of tax reforms on the stock market
and investment are presented in the sixth section of the
paper. Reforms considered include changes in the
investment tax credit, corporat.e tax integration, corporate tax rate-5-
reduction, and the abolition of capital gains taxation.
The dynamics of the response to announced changes in future
tax rates are also examined. The seventh and final section
of the paper discusses some implications of the results and
suggests directions ,for future research.
II. THE STOCK MARKET AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
This section examines the dynamics of investment
and market valuation in a simplified model where all invest-
ment is financed through retained earnings and the only tax
is a proportional levy on corporate income. In this setting
it is reasonable to assume that investment depends on the
ratio of the market value of existing capital to its re-
placement cost. Unless the market value of the firm will be
increased by more than one dollar by a one dollar invest-
ment, there is no reason for it to be undertaken. Given
costs of adjustments and lags in recognition and implementa-
tion, there is no reason to expect that all investments which
will raise market value by more than their cost will be made
immediately. As Tobin (1969) has argued, these considerations
lead to an investment equation of the form:-6-
I = (1)
I(l) = a I' > a
where I represents gross investment and V/K is the "q"
ratio of market value to replacement cost. The assumption _
that it is IlK which depen:1s on q insures that the growth
rate of the capital stock does not depend upon the scale
of the economy.
It is assumed that equity owners require a fixed
real rate of return p to induce them to hold the existing
stock of equity. This return comes in the form of dividends,
equal to after tax profits less retentions for new invest-
ment, and capital gains. Hence we have the condition:
which implies:
(2 )
v = pV - (l-T) F' (K) K + I (~) K + oK (3)
,
where t is the corporate tax rate, and F(K) is the production
function for net output.
(.ll A rigorous foundation for an investment equation of this
type is provided in the next section. The analysis in
this section is only intended to be illustrative since
adjustment costs are neglected. An important implicit
assumption of this .approach is the homogeneity of capital.
If capital is heterogeneous, shocks may reduce the market
value of existing capital but raise the return on new in-
vestment. The recent energy shock illustrates this phe-
nomenon.-7-
It will be most convenient to examine the dynamics in
terms of K and q = R. Equations (I) and (3) imply that
the system's equations of motion are:
K= I{q)K - 15K (4)
q = [p - I{q) + oJq + I{q) - (l-T)F' (K) - 0 (5)
where 0 is the rate of depreciation.
The steady state properties of the model are easily found
by imposing the conditions K= 0 and q = O. These imply:
(l-L)F' (K) = pq
(6)
( 7)
The former equation indicates that the steady state value
of q must be greater than 1 by an amount just large enough
to induce sufficient investment to cover depreciation. The
latter equation holds that firms equate their net marginal
product of capital to the cost of capital. Inspection of
(6) and (7) makes it clear that a change in the corporate
tax rate affects the steady state capital stock but has no
effect on steady state q. This is a consequence of the
assumption that it is investment relative to the capital
stock which varies with q.-8-
The phase diagram of the system (4) and (5) is
displayed in Figure 1. It is readily verified that the
pair of equations is saddle point stable (2) . The arrows
indicate the directions of motion and the heavy line
represents the saddle point path along which the system
will converge. A change in the corporate tax rate is
depicted in Figure 2 (3) • If the expectations about pre-
tax profits were static, the value of q would Jump from E
to A when the tax chan:Je took place. This expectations assumption
has been used in previous work on the effects of taxation on the
stock market, (Feldstein (1979), Hendershott (1979). It
neglects the effect of the induced changes in investment
on the present value of future profits. With perfect fore-
sight, as assumed here, the value of q will jump only to B.
The magnitude of the jump will depend upon the speed of
adjustment of the capital stock to the shock.
The system of equations (4) and (5) can be solved
numerically to estimate the impact of any type of shock
on the path of q and the capital stock. The effect of
(2)
01
This is a common feature of models with asset prices.
Abel (1979) was the first to use an approach of this
type to analyze investment incentives.












tax changes on the level of the stock market can then
be easily calculated. This is the approach taken below
to estimating the effects of tax changes. In the next
section the firm's optimization problem is considered
explicitly, and the tax structure is enriched. The dynamics
parallel those described above.
III. THE FIRM'S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In what follows the behavior of a representative,
competitive firm seeking to maximize the market value of
its equity is considered. We begin by examining how
individuals value corporate stock, and then turn to the
firm's decision problem. Throughout, it is assumed that
firms neither issue new equity, nor repurchase existing
shares (4) . Hence share prices are proportional to the
outstanding value of a firm's equity. We continue to
assume that equity holders require a fixed real after tax
return P in order to induce them to hold the outstanding
equity. The value of p is not affected by either changes
(4 )
Under the conditions described below firms would
never want to issue new equity. Legal restrictions
severely limit firms' ability to repurchase their
own shares. A discussion of these restrictions and
the limitations of other mechanisms which might seem
to be functionally equivalent to repurchasing shares
is contained in Auerbach (1979 a).-11-
in the tax rules or the quantity of equity. While this
assumption may seem extreme, Summers (1980a) shows that in
plausible general equilibrium models, tax changes are
unlikely to have a large impact on the real after tax
return required by equity holders. The required return
p is the sum of capital gains and dividends net of tax.
It follows that:
(8)
where c represents the effective. accrual rate of taxation on capital
gains(S), and eD the tax rate on dividends, and ~ is
the rate of inflation. Differences in the tax rates faced
by different investors are ignored. To solve this
differential equation it is necessary to impose a trans-
versality condition. We do this by requiring that at time t;
_
(tS ( Jl P+Tr)du
lim V . e = 0 s
S-+CO
This condition precludes the possibility of an explosive
solution to (1).
With the transversality condition satisfied and the
assumption of perfect foresight, the solution to (1)
becomes:
(S) This corresponds to the statutory rate adjusted for





e t l-c ds (10)
In the steady state where taxes, the price level and
dividends are held constant, this expression reduces to:
In this case capital gains taxes do not matter because
there are no capital gains. More generally, as in (10)
capital gains taxes raise the discount rate on future
dividends, as well as affecting the valuation of current
dividends. Note that equation (10) implies that because
of dividend taxes an extra dollar of promised dividends
raises share valuation by only (l-eD).
The firm seeks to choose an investment and financial
(11)
policy to maximize (10) subject to the constraints it faces.
It is constrained by its initial capital stock and by a
sources equal uses of funds requirement. It will also be
necessary to assume that credit market constraints do not
permit the firm to finance more than a fraction(6) of its
(6) This is a crude way of modelling the effects of bankruptcy
costs on the firm's choice of a debt equity ratio. As
noted below, the ~ssumption of a constant debt-capital
ratio is a fairly good representation of the recent
American experience. McDonald (1980) treats the choice
of financial pOlicy in more detail.-13-
investment through debt finance. In the model presented
below, this constraint will always be binding, so we
assume that a share b of all new investment comes from
debt issues and the remainder is financed through retained
earnings. Finally, the firm cannot change its capital
stock costlessly. The cost of installing extra capital
is assumed to rise with rate of capital accumulation. For con-
venience, it is assumed that the cost function is convex and homo-
geneous in investment and capital. Under these conditions dividends
b d . d ft f' 1 . (7) may e er1ve as a er tax pro 1tS ess 1nvestment expenses.
That is:
Div = [PF(K,L) - wL -pbiK ] (1-T) - (1 - ITC - b + (1-TH)PI
R + TD +pbK(1T-O) (12)
where K and L refer to factor inputs, p is the overall
price level, F (K,L) is the production function, w is
the wage rate, i is the nominal interest rate, T is the
corporate tax rate, ITC is the investment tax credit,
(7)
The assumption here is that all marginal equity finance
comes from retained earnings. This'follows from the
assumption of a constant number of shares made earlier.
It accounts for some of the apparently parad0xical results
described below. The last term reflects the net receipts
from new debt issues (withdravla19) necessary to maintain the
debt-capital ratio as the capital stock depreciates and the
price level rises.-14-
~ is the adjustment cost function which is assumed to be con-
vex, I represents investment, oR is the real rate of depreciation,
and D represents the value of currently allowable depreciation
allowances. It has been assumed that adjustment costs are ex-
pensed and ineligible for the investment tax credit. (8)
The tax law is assumed to allow for exponential depreciation
at rate oT that may differ from oR, but to be based on historical
cost. This implies that:
l
OOT
D = 0 P sou
I u
T
-0 (s-u) e du (13)
Combining equations (2) and (5), making use of (6) and
rearranging yields an expression for the value of a firm's
equity at time t:
Vt = ~oo[(PF(K'L) - wL -pbKi ) (l-'r) - (1 - ITC - Zs- b
(14)
(8) Assuming that adjustment expenses were treated as investment
under the tax lawwould not importantly alter the results.
If these costs are taken to represent managerial effort, or
as interference with concurrent production, the assumption
in the text is appropriate.-15-
All the tax parameters can be arbitrary functions of time.
For ease of exposition the following symbols have been
introduced:






Bt = L 0 e lJ s ds o s (l-c)






These rather formidable expressions have simple interpreta-
tions. Bt represents the present value of depreciation
allowances on existing capital, Zs is the present value,
evaluated at times of the depreciation on a dollar of new
investment. In maximizing (14) the firm can ignore Bt
since it is independent of any future decisions. The
constraint faced by the firm in maximizing (14) is then:
holding that capital accumulation equals net investment.
The first order conditions for optimality are(9):
(9)
(16)
Similar conditions differing because of assumptions
about taxation have been derived by Hayashi (1979) and
Abel (1979).-16-
(17a)
(1 - ITC - Z - b + ~(l-.)) = I (1-.) K ~' (17b)
(17c)
Equation (17b) characterizes the investment function. It
implicitly defines a function linking investment to the
real shadow price of capital A/p and the tax parameters.
The condition for zero investment is that:
1 = (1-e
O
) [1 - ITC - Z - b]
P (I-c) (18)
This result can be characterized in intuitive terms. It
implies that the shadow price of additional capital goods
is equated to their marginal cost in after tax dollars.
Equation (18) implies that there will be investment even
if the shadow price of new capital goods is less than 1.
This is because taxes and debt finance reduce the effective
price of new capital goods.-17-
Equation (17b) is of no operational significance
as a theory of investment unless an observable counterpart
to the shadow price Alp can be developed. Hayashi (1979)
has shown in a similar model with a less elaborate tax
system how the shadow price is linked to the market valuation
of existing capital. The derivation below follows his











using the definition of~. The first order conditions
(17) imply that equation (19) can be rewritten:
(1)2 (I_eO)
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The real shadow price of additional capital may thus be
expressed as a function of the firm's market value. The term
Bt is subtracted from market value since the depreciation
allowances the firm will receive on existing capital provide no
inducement to further investment. Substituting equation (21)
in equation (17b) yields an investment function expressable
entirely in terms of observables.
.






- 1 + b + ITC + Z
(l-T)
) (22)
where h ( ) = ($+ ~ $,)-1. Equation (22) is the
structural investment function relating investment and
stockmarket valuation which will be estimated in the-19-
next section. It also implies an equation of motion for
the capital stock, and so is the rigorous generalization
of equation (1).
The equation of motion for q, the ratio of stock
market value to the value of the capital stock can be
written as:
• = p+1T (I-eO) Oiv ( ~K·)
q (I-c) q - (1-6-)- pK - q 1T +
.
h where Oiv is given by equation (12) , and K is defined by
equation (22). We begin by examining the steady state
properties of the system (22) and (23). Solving for
(23)
the steady state values of q and K yields the conditions.







( K) = [p+c (g+1T) ] q* (l--d + bi +
+ (oR +g) - b(g+1T) (25)
where g is the growth rate of effective labor. In the
special case where adjustment is costless, these expressions
take on a more familiar form. In this case if we also assume
oR = oT, the steady state conditions become:q*
-20-
= (I-aD) [1 - b - ITCJ
(I-c) (26)
(I-or) F'(K) + (ITC) (g+o) = (p+c 'IT) (1-b) + b ( (I-or) i -'IT )
(I-c)
(27)
These expressions are equivalent to those derived
by Auerbach (1979a, 1979b). Assuming all equity finance and
ignoring the investment tax credit, equation (26) yields his
formula for steady state q. The value of steady state q
is less than one because of the difference between dividend
and capital gains tax rates. Firms find it optimal to invest
past the point where a dollar's expenditure raises market value
by a dollar, since the alternative is to payout heavily taxed
dividends. The latter expression holds that the cost of
capital is a weighted average of the costs of debt and equity
capital. Note that cost of equity capital depends only on the
capital gains tax rate and not on the dividend rate. That is
to say permanent dividend taxation has no distortionary effects.
Permanent increases in the dividend tax rate are the cause of an
immediate fall in the stock market, exactly offsetting the
reduced opportunity cost to shareowners of investment funds.
gb - The symbolb here refers to the debtb capital ratio. In
Auerbach's work it refers to the debt-market value ratio.
The results here would not be importantly altered but the
calculations would become much more complex if a constant
debt-market value ratio were assumed.-21-
For given tax parameters, the phase diagram for the
system (22) and (23) looks just like that one depicted in
Figure 1. It also exhibits saddle point stability. There
is again a unique path, indicated by the heavy arrows,along which
the system can converge to equilibrium. On this perfect
foresight path, investment is just sufficient to actualize
the market's expectations about future dividends. This phase
diagram can be used to study the relationship between tax
changes, market valuation and investment.
Consider for example an increase in the investment
tax credit as shown in Figure 3. The steady state capital
stock unambiguously increases. In the long run the value
of q falls since the credit reduces the "effective" replace-
ment cost of capital goods. The short run impact on stock
market valuation is ambiguous, depending on the rapidity of
adjustment. It is possible for q to jump to any point
between A, corresponding to no capital stock adjustment,
and B, corresponding to an instantaneous adjustment of the
capital stock. It is thus possible that the stock market
may decline even though investment has been encouraged.
Exactly parallel results hold for a decline in the capital
gains tax rate, or acceleration of tax depreciation. An
increase in the corporate tax rate, as shown in Figure 4,
has an ambiguous effect on long run capital accumulation.-22-


















The q = 0 schedule is likely to shift backwards, reflecting
the effect of increased taxes in reducing dividends. However,
the K= 0 locus will shift downwards because of the expending
of adjustment costs and the increased value of untaxed
depreciation allowances. Hence the value of the market will
unambiguously decline in the short run, but the short run
impact on investment and the long run impact on the capital
stock are indeterminate.
A substantial virtue of the approach to modelling
investment decisions developed here is that it can easily
be used to analyze the effects of announced but not yet
implemented tax changes, and temporary tax measures. This
can be illustrated by considering the effects of an announce-
ment that at some point in the future, the dividend tax rate
will be increased. This situation is shown in Figure 5.
There is no immediate effect on either schedule. At time t,
when the tax increase takes effect, both schedules shift down-
wards as shown by the dashed lines. As already noted, a
dividend tax change has no impact on long run capital intensity.
But the change does alter the timing of investment decisions.
Firms have an incentive to pay extra dividends before the
dividend tax increase takes effect, and to pay lower subse-
quent dividends. Following the announcement, stock market
declines to point A~ as firms raise dividends and reduce
investment, the system moves towards B. At time t when the-24-
















dividend tax is increased to economy moves along the stable
arm from B to the new equilibrium C. Note that the announce-
ment of the tax reduces investment but that investment rises
sharply at the moment when it takes effect.
All these examples illustrate cases where tax changes
can have opposite effects on the stock market and investment.
This demonstrates the importance of taking tax factors into
account in estimating relations between market valuation and
investment. This is done in the next section which describes
the estimation of the model outlined above.
IV. ESTIMATING THE MODEL
This section describes the empirical estimation of
the model outlined in the preceeding section. There are
two behavioral functions describing adjustment costs and
production which have to be estimated along with p) the
required real return on equity.
A. The Investment Function
For simplicity we postulate that the adjustment cos~
are piecewise linear with adjustment costless up to ZOP1C '1ormal
level of investment, and then rising linearly' with investment












) is given by: It follows that the function ¢ (
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which is homgoeneous in ~ as required.
(29)
This implies that the investment function (22) can be
written as:
I = h-l(Q) = y + 1 Q
K e










By estimating equation (30) the parameters of the adjust-
ment cost function </>( ) can be inferred. This" is the approach
taken below.-27-
Several authors including Von Furstenberg (1977),
Ciccolo (1975, 1977) and Engle and Foley (1975) have estim-
ated variants on equation (30). With the exception of
Ciccolo (1977), no account was taken of tax effects. Cicco-
lo's tax adjustments differ from. those used here because he
takes no account of individual taxes, and implicitly makes
different assumptions about the tax treatment of adjustment
costs. Theee studies have all related components of business
fixed investment to q, which may not be appropriate for non-
corporate investment. They have all been confined to the post-
Korean War period during which tax changes have been relatively
minor.
In order to focus on tax effects, the work reported here
examined the determinants of non-financial corporate invest-
ment over the entire 1932-1978 period. The extension of the
sample period allows the substantial variation in tax par-
ameters. The dividend tax rate has varied between .15 and
.58 during the period while the corporate rate has varied
between .18 and .70. Extending the equation back this far
necessitates some crudeness in the calcualtion of Q, and forces
the use of annual data. Since the focus here is on long
run issues, this is probably not too serious a problem.
The calculation of the various components of Q is des-
cribed below. A full listing of all the series is included
in the paper's data appendix.-28-
v --- The stock market value of non-financial cor-
porations is estimated by capitalizing non-financial cor-
porate dividends using the Standard and Poor's dividend
yield.
K The capital stock K is taken to be the sum of
equipment, structures and inventories all valued at current
replacement cost. (10)
B --- The present value of depreciation allowances is
estimated in several stages. First, the value of the de-
preciable capital stock, KDEP is calculated using the per-
petual inventory method, and annual data an investment and
tax depreciation. Second, the tax depreciation rate is es-
timated as the ratio of tax depreciation to KDEP. Third, B
is calculated from equation (lSb) assuming static expecta-
tions about the corporate tax rate, a constant value of p=
A6 d .. fl t' . (11) ., an autoregress~ve ~n a ~on expectat~ons.
b --- The fraction of investment which is debt financed
is assumed to equal the ratio of the market value of out-
standing debt to the capital stock. The market value of
debt is estimated by capitalizing net interest payments at
the BAA interest rate. (12)
(10) The data on capital stocks, stock market values, and
market value of debt are taken from Holland and Myers
(1979) .
(11) In particular rre is generated using the rolling ARMA
approach described in Feldstein and Summers (1978). To-29-
C --- It is difficult to measure the effective capital
gains tax rate because of the problems inherent in estimating
the effects of deferral and the absence of constructive rea1-
ization at death. Following Bailey (1969) we assume that each
of these factors halves the effective rate. From 1932-1969,
the statutory rate on capital gains was half the rate on div-
idends. Hence for this period the capital gains rate' was
estimated at 12.5% of the average marginal dividend tax rate.:{.13}
For the 1969-1978 period, the effect of the 1969 capital gains
reforms is proxied by assuming that the capital gains rate
is 50% higher or 18.75% of the dividend rate. (14)
find expected inflation in year t,an ARMA (1, 1) process
is fitted to the previous 20 years'data. Expected
inflation is then a 10 year disoounted average of the forecasts
of the future inflation rates. The discount rate is .08.
The calculation is performed using the consumer price
index.
(12) This procedure would only be strictly appropriate if all
bonds were conso1s. Comparing the resu1ts~ with those
of Von Furstenberg's (1977) more careful adjustment
suggests that the error is not likely to be large.
(13) The construction of this series is discussed below.
(14) These reforms included the minimum tax, maximum tax,
and special provisions relating to preference income.
The estimate that these reforms raised effective rates
by about 50 percent is derived from the NBER TAXSIM
model.-30-
o e --- The marginal tax rate on dividends is estimated
as a weighted average of individual marginal rates with
weights equal to the share of dividends going to taxpayers
in each marginal rate c1ass.1S Because of data limitations,
no account is taken of equity owned outside the household
sector.
ITC --- The effective rate of the investment tax credit
is the statutory rate, as adjusted by ORI to reflect the
effects of eligibility rules, times the share of investment
devoted to equipment.
Z --- The present value of future depreciation allowances
on a dollar's investment is calculated on the basis of tax
lifetime and depreciation methods reported by ORI. Static
expectations about future corporate tax rates are assumed.
~ --- The corporate tax rate is the maximum statutory
marginal tax rate on corporate income.
The estimated values of Q are shown in Table 1 along
with estimated values of q as normally calculated. The most
striking feature of the table is the pronounced drop in q
over the fifty year period. The value of q actually peaked
in 1937. Tax factors can account for a large part of this
decline. Rising dividend and corporate tax rates have
reduced equilibrium market values. Indeed, such factors
would lead one to predict a drop of about 30 percent in q
(lS) The series are taken with adjustments from Wright (1969)
and Brinner and Brooks (1979).-31-
TABLE 1









































































are described in the text. q is
measure of q as used by Von Furstenberg
Q is the tax adjusted series discussed-33-
between 1932 and 1978. Taxes also account for another
apparent anomaly in the data. Despite the fact that many
assets of firms, such as intangibles, are excluded from
the denominator of the q ratio, it appears that q averages
sUbstantially less than 1, and positive investment takes
place. In contrast, the tax adjusted variable Q is greater
than the investment threshold of zero in every year except
1932. (16) Indeed, viewed in terms of Q it appears that on
average, the market if anything overvalues corporate assets.
Table 2 presents estimates of simple investment
functions using Q and q as explanatory variables. The
dependent variable is defined as the change in the net capital
stock plus depreciation divided by the value of the beginning
of year capital stock. Before examining the results, it is
necessary to make several comments on the estimation.
First, the estimates here are not intended to provide
the best possible fit of actual investment behavior during
the sample period. They undoubtedly could be improved by
adding additional variables reflecting business cycle
d't' t th t' t d . (17) . h con ~ ~ons 0 e es~ma e equat~ons.· S~nce t e concern




Second, the appropriate treatment of autocorrelation
Note that in a world without taxes, Q = q - 1.
Inclusion of such variables would make it very difficult
to interpret the coefficient on Q.TABLE 2
Q Investment Equations a
Equation
R2 Number Constant q-1 Q £. D.W.
1. .080 - .013 - .046 .290
( •009) (.007)
2. .094 -.026 - - .027 .375
( •005) (.017)
3. .071 - .016 .882 .724 1.39
(.021) (.007)
I
4. .083 .035 .909 .711 1.40 w - .c::.
(.027) (.020) I
51? .060 .027 .900 .750 1.42
(.024) - ( .007)
61? .078 .050 - ; .933 .712 1.50
(.034) (.020)
7. .130 -.077 .041 .760 .724 1.34
(.036) (.043) (.015)
Note: a} Equations are estimated using time series data for the period 1932-1978.
Equations 1 and 2 are estimated without correction for autocorre1ations.
b) Sum of coefficients on variable and lagged variable-35-
is unclear in this context. As Engle and Foley emphasize,
theory suggests that most of the power in the relation be-
tween investment and Q is at low frequencies. Shiller (1979)
has shown that there is substantial noise in share price
movements. Transforming the data to correct for autocorrela-
tion places greater weight on the high frequencies and there-
f b · . (18) Th' d h' 1 . 1 ore may e ~nappropr~ate. ~r , w ~ e not str~ct y
justified by the theory, lagged Q's are included in the in-
vestment equations to take account of delivery lags and the
inevitable arbitrariness in the time when investment projects
show up in the national income accounts.
The results provide mild evidence that tax adjustments
enhance the power of movements in market valuation in ex-
plaining investment. Using ordinary least squares, q has the
wrong sign, while Q is marginally significant with the right
sign. (19)
These equations exhibit extreme serial correlation.
When an autocorrelation correction is made as in the third
and fourth equations, there is little to choose between the
two specifications. The Q equation provides a marginally
better fit and exhibits somewhat less autocorrelation.
(18) This point is amplified in Sims (1972) . It is a variant
in the frequently made observation that autocorrelation
corrections exacerbate the errors in variables problems.
(19) Since OLS gives inconsistent estimates of the standard
errors, not too much can be made of this observation.-36-
Including lagged values raised the explanatory power of both
equations but does not alter their relative perfonnance. When
both concepts are entered together, the Q variable completely
dominates the unadjusted variable which becomes statistically
significant with the wrong sign. Alternative specifications
not shown here suggest that these results are not signif-
icantly affected by the inclusion of additional lags, time
trends, or the exclusion of the War years from the sample.
Estimates for the 1954-1978 period yield quite similar
results, though for this shorter period there is no basis
at all for choosing between the q and Q specifications.
The parameter estimates are comparable to those suggested









the implied estimate is that a 10 percent increase in the value
of the stock market raises I by about .008. This result
K
parallels closely to the implications of earlier studies.
These equations can be used to solve for the parameters
of the adjustment cost function. Equation (5) for example implies that
<t>ti) = 18.5 (~)- .060) (33)-37-
This is the equation used in the simulations reported
below.
B. The Production Function
It is assumed that production in the non-financial
corporate sector is Cobb-Douglas. This assumption is borne
out by the approximate constancy of factor shares, and appears
to be consistent with the available empirical evidence. (21)
The share of capital in the output of the non-financial
corporate sector averaged .16 during the period 1970-1978.
This is taken to be the share of capital in the production
functions.
C. Other Parameters
The required after tax real return on equity is taken
to be .06. This corresponds closely to the average pre-tax
real return of 8.4 percent reported by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1976)
for the period 1926-1976. The real interest rate is taken
to be .02 which corresponds closely to the real BAA. yield over the same
period. Following Feldstein and Summers (1978) it is
assumed that inflation raises interest rates point for point. (22)
The value of 6 is estima~ed at .067 from the data used in
estimating the investment equation. The growth rate
(20) Cross sectional production function estimates generally
suggest an elasticity of substitution of close to 1, while
time series studies usually yield lower estimates. The
relative merits of these approaches are assessed in Lucas
(1969) •
(21) This assumption appears to fit the rent data, but need not
be even approximately accurate in the presence of non-indexed
taxes.-38-
of effective labor, y is taken to be .03.
The remaining parameters to be discussed characterize
the tax system. Tax parameters are calculated as described
above and are in the base case set equal to their 1978 values.
eo T These are: ~ = .48; ITC = .056; = .44; c = .083; 0 = .10.
In the simulations, one additional complication is introduced.
Inflation raises the effective tax rate on corporate capital
by taxing nominal inventory profits of firms using FIFO
accounting. In 1978 when the rate of inflation was 7.4,
these profits !represented 24.3 billion or.33 percent of
non-financial corporate output per point of inflation. It
is assumed in the simulations that each point of inflation
raises the corporate tax base by this fraction of corporate
output.
At this point, the effects of tax and inflation changes
can be studied. The system of equations (22) and (23) can be
solved numerica1ly(23) to find the path of investment and
the stock market. This is done in the next section. Table
3 characterizes then no inflation steady state of the model
under the assumptions made here. This steady state appears
to afford a reasonable benchmark for studying tax changes.
The pre-tax marginal product of capital is .147. Netof
(22) The model is solved using the mUltiple shooting algorithm
described in Lipton, et al. (1980).-39-
steady state aadjustment costs the pre-tax rate of profit
is .134. While this number is somewhat higher than standard
estimates of the rate of profit, this reflects the fact that
land is omitted from consideration here. Adjustment costs
are estimated to comprise 9 percent of gross profit. It
is difficult to evaluate this assumption since adjustment
costs are not directly observable. (24) If adjustment costs
are neglected, estimates of the effects of tax changes are
altered only slightly. The effective tax rate on corporate
source income is fairly close to the value that was observed
prior to the period of rapid inflation. Finally, the earnings
price ratio and dividend yield appear to be reasonable. In
any event experimentation suggested that the estimated im-
pacts of tax changes were not very sensitive to the initial
choice of parameters.
(24) The· level of investment does enter with a significant
negative sign in standard cyclical profit equations
of the type estimated by Feldstein and Summers (1977).-40-
TABLE 3



















Notes: (a) includes only taxes levied at the corporate
level-41--
v. INFLATION EFFECTS
In this section, the model of investment and
market valuation described in the preceeding section is
used to evaluate the impact of inflation on the non-financial
corporate sector. Four separate non-neutralities of the
tax system lead to real effects of inflation. 25 First,
historical cost depreciation causes inflation to raise the
effective corporate tax rate. It is important to note
that the understatement of depreciation for tax purposes
depends on the entire history of the inflation rate not just
on its current level. In 1977, historic cost depreciation
raised corporate tax liabilities by $19.1 billion or 32.4
percent of actual tax liabilities. Second, firms which use
FIFO inventory accounting incur extra tax liabilities an their
nominal inventory profits. 26 The size of this effect varies
with the inflation rate. In 1977, tax liabilities were
(25)
(26)
These non-neutralities are discussed in more detail in
Summers (1980b). Evidence of their aggregate importance
can be found in Feldstein und Summers (1979).
Although the extra taxes due to FIFO accounting are in a
sense voluntary, managements presumably pay these taxes
because they believe that there would be greater costs of
some other kind if they used LIFO and reported lower
profits. As long as firms pay higher taxes based on FIFO
accountin~ these taxes do affect investment decisions.-42-
increased by $7 billion or 12.1 percent of actual tax liabili-
ties. By 1979, this had risen to $19 billion or 27 percent
of tax liabilities. Third, firms are permitted to deduct
nominal rather than real interest payments for tax purposes.
Equivalently stated, they are not taxed on the capital gain which
they realize as inflation erodes the value of their outstand-
ing debt. This offsets the effects of historic cost deprecia-
tion and nominal inventory accounting and reduces. the tax
burden on corporate capital by 26.4 percent in 1977!27) Fourth,
the taxation of nominalJ:T.ather than real capital gains
leads to an increase in the pre-tax real return on equity
demanded by investors. This effect is potentially very large.
Nominal capital gains on corporate capital stock totalled
$112 billion in 1977, implying an extra tax liability of about
$10 billion. (28)
On balance, these effects imply that inflation
substantially increases the effective tax rate on corporate
equity. Feldstein (1979a) has suggested that this could
(27)
(28)
This discussion and calcualtion ignore the one-time capital
gains firms realize on the revaluation of their long term
debt when the inflation rate rises. Summers (1980b) shows
that this effect can be very substantial for some firms.
This effect is masked by the downwards recapitalization
of the market caused by unexpected increases in the rate
of inflation.-43-
provide an explanation for the observed decline in the stock
market. This conclusion has been challenged by Hendershott
(1979), Fama (1979) and Modigliani and Cohn (1974). None of
these analyses have taken account of the endogneity of capital
accumulation and its impact on market valuation. Nor have
they recognized that taxes complicate the determination of the
long run relationship between market valuation and the replace-
ment cost of the capital stock. Only Feldstein considers the
implications of his analysis for the long run growth of the
corporate sector. He does not however consider the nature of
the adjustment path after an inflation shock.
Before turning to the results one qualification must
be stressed. The assumption is maintained throughout that
inflation has no impact on the rate of return required by
equity owners. This assumption is open to question. (29) Many
observers have argued that inflation reduces real after tax
interest rates and so should also be assumed to reduce requirec
after tax returns on equity. .This argument presumes that
(29) The arguments of Hendershott (1979), Gordon and Malkie1
(1979), and Modig1ian and Cohn (1979) that inflation
should not discourage investment are based on the assump-
tion that it reduces the real return on other assets
particularly bonds.-44-
inflation has no effect on the equity risk premium and that
bonds are the relevant alternative asset. If the alternatives
to holding equity, include tax sheltered fonns of saving such
as owner occupied housing, this assumption is inappropriate.
Further, there is theoretical reason to believe that in the
very long run inflation should raise real interest rates. (30)
The effect of inflation on market valuation and
investment is gauged by simulating the effects of an unexpected
permanent increase from 0 to 8 percent in the rate of inflation.
The paths of the variables of interest are shown in Table 4.
All variables are measured as percentage changes from the
benchmark steady state values displayed in Table 3. The
results indicate that inflation can have very large effects on
capital accumulation in the corporate sector. The immediate
effect of the 8 percent inflation shock is to reduce the value
of the stock market by 22.7 percent. This is associated with
a 16.8 percent reduction in the rate of investment.
As the capital output ratio declines, raising the
pre-tax marginal product of capital, the stock market tends to
rise relative to the replacement cost of the capital stock.
(30) Summers (1980) suggests that this will take place in
almost any plausible model with non-indexed taxes on
capit;al income.-45-
TABLE 4
Dynamic Response to an 8 Percent
Inflation Shock
Year v
-.r -'----'-'-- ._-.' _._-_._.
I K ~+b
K
1 -22.7 -16.8 0 -17.4
2 -24.0 -17.8 -1.6 -17.3
3 -25.0 -18.8 -3.2 -17.2
4 -25.9 -18.8 -4.7 -17.0
5 -26.6 -19.8 -6.1 -16.7
10 -29.2 -22.8 -12.1 -14.9
15 -30.7 -24.8 -16.8 -12.8
20 -31.9 -26.7 -20.4 -10.9
50 -34.8 -32.7 -30.9 - 4.42
STEADY STATE -36.0 -34.4 -34.4 2.16
_. - ~_.__ .. -"~----' -...- . . __.
.~. - .," .-46-
In the long run the 8 percent rate of inflation reduces the
capital stock by 34.4 percent and the value of the stock
market by 36 percent. The transition is quite slow.as only
three quarters of the ultimate adjustment of the capital
stock takes place within 20 years. The impact of inflation
on the rate of investment actually increases over time
reflecting the reduced need for replacement investment as
the capital stock contracts.
These results suggests that inflation can account for
a large part of the decline in the stock market and investment
which has occurred during the last decade. After 10 years of
8 percent inflation, the stock market is almost 30 percent
lower in real terms than it would have been in the absence
of inflation. The 22 percent decline in gross investment
indicated by the simulation is somewhat larger than the decline
which has actually occurred. This probably reflects the
increases in the investment tax credit, and the acceleration
of tax depreciation which have~ place during the 1970's!3l)
As shown in the next section, these measures are a significant
spur to investment, but are not likely to significantly increase
stock market values.
(31) The investment tax credit was suspended at the beginning
of the decade and applied at a 9 percent rate in 1979.
The ADR system introduced in 1971 has shortened deprecia-
tion lifetimes by about 20 percent.-47-
The results in Table 4 suggest that 8 percent infla-
tion slows the rate of growth of the capital stock by about
1.1 percent a year for the first decade. The production
function used here implied that this leads to a decline of
about.2 percent a year in the rate of growth of productivity.
The long run impact of inflation according to these calculations
is to reduce corporate sector output and wages by about 6
percent below the level that would have been reached in the
absence of inflation. This is a quite substantial effect. It
implies that if inflation continues at current ratio until the
year 2000, per-capita output of the corporate sector in that year will
be reduced by $420 a year below its no inflation level.
These results suggest that inflation has substantial
effects on market valuation and investments. It is frequently
proposed that these non-neutralities be remedied through
indexation of the tax system. The effects of inflation on
the stock market and investment under various partial indexing
schemes is shown in Table S. As well as illustrating the
effects of indexing, the Table make it possible to examine the
relative importance of the various distortions associated
with inflation. Full indexing leaves the tax system completely
neutral, so it is not shown in the Table.
Indexing depreciation allowances and inventory accounting
while doing nothing about the profits firms realize on their-48-
outstanding debt would lead to a situation where inflation
significantly encouraged investment. Under such indexing
rules, an 8percent increase in the expected rate of inflation
would raise the stock market by 10 percent. This is because
the non-neutrality associated with the deduction of nominal
interest payments is greater than the distortion due to the
taxation of capital gains. These results imply that indexing
depreciation allowances would reduce the equilibrium ratio of
the stock market values to the replacement cost of the capital
stock. This is because indexation raises the value of
reducing the effective price of new capital goods.
The effects of full indexing at the corporate level are
shown in column (2). The remaining distortion, the taxation
of nominal capital gains, leads a reduction in the stock market
and capital formation. The capital gains distortion alone is
sufficient to cause 8 percent inflation to reduce the steady
state capital, stock by over 11 percent. Thus the taxation of
nominal capital gains is responsible for about one-third of
the total reduction in capital accumulation caused by inflation.
Indexation at the individual level but not at the corporate
level is considered in the third column of the Table. The
results show that corporate tax non-neutralities are responsible
for a large fraction of inflation's impact on capital formation.
They show clearly that contrary to assertions made by some-49-
authors, the effect of inflation on inventory profits and
depreciation allowances more than offsets the deductibility
of nominal interest payments. This is because the analysis
here takes explicit account of the growth in the understatement
of depreciation allowances which accompanies prolonged inflation.
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of the robust-
ness of these results to changes in the assumptions about the
underlying parameters. The qualitative results and long run
estimates are almost completely unaffected by plausible changes
in the parameters. Reductions in the assumed elasticity of
substittltion reduce the sensitivity of tre steady state capital
stock to inflation. Plausible changes in the adjustment cost
function alter the size of the initial jump in the stock
market and the speed of adjustment, but the effects are not
very large.-50-
TABLE 5
Effects of Indexation (a)
Indexed(b)
Full corporate(c) Indexed(d) Year Depreciation
and Inventory Indexing Capital Gains
V I V I V I
1 + 9.3 +12.9 7.7 6.9 -15.7 -11.8
2 ;+ 9.9 +12.9 7.9 6.9 -16.8 -11.8
3 +10.5 +13.9 8.2 - 6.9 -17.7 -12.9
4 +11.1 +14.9 8.4 7.9 -18.5 -13.9
5 +11.7 +15.8 - 8.6 - 7.9 -19.1 -13.9
10 +13.9 +18.8 - 9.5 - 8.9 -21.4 -15.8
15 +15.8 +20.8 -10.2 9.9 -22.7 -17.8
20 +17.4 +22.8 -10.7 -10.9 -23.5 -19.8
50 +21.8 +29.7 -12.3 -13.9 -26.0 -23.8
-Steady +23.8 +32.7 -11. 5 -12.9 -27.3 -24.8
State
Notes:
(a) All numbers shown are percentage changes from
the benchmark steady state shown in Table 3.
(b) It is assumed that replacement cost depreciation
is allowed on existing assets as well as new investments.
(c) It is assumed here that firms are only permitted to
deduct real interest payments for tax purposes.
(d) Only real capital gains are taxed~ The simulation
in this column assumes no indexation at the corporate
level.-51-
VI. ALTERNATIVE TAX REFORMS
This section begins by considering the impact of the
investment tax credit, since this issue has been a focus of
previous work. Standard single equation approaches to the
investment function have yielded divergent results. In perhaps
the most widely cited study, Hall and Jorgenson (1971) conclude
that the investment tax credit has a potent impact, which
reaches its peak after about 3 years. They estimated that the
7 percent creditonequiptment enacted in 1962 raised the 1970
capital stock by about 4 percent above the level it would have
reached in the absence of the credit. Other estimates
typically suggest much smaller estimates of the effect of the
credit. None of the estimates takes explicit account of the
possibly temporary nature of changes in the level of the credit.
In Table 6 the effects of alternative tax credit
policies are considered. The first column considers the effects
of a correctly perceived permanent removal of the credit. The
results indicate that the credit has potent effects on invest-
ment, even though it has only a small impact on market valuation
in the short run. (32) Its immediate effect is to reduce
investment by about 6 percent, and it decreases the capital stock
by 8.9 percent in the long run. The estimated response is
(32) This illustrates the point made in Section III, that changes
in unadjusted q may be a poor guide to investment incentives.-52-
TABLE 6
Permanent and Temporary Removal of the
Investment Tax Credit(a)
PERIvIANENT TEMPORARY (b)
Year V I K V I K
1 -2.8% -6.0% 0% -2.0% 0% 0%
., -3.0% -4.8% -0.4% -0.5% 0% -0.1% "
3 -3.0% -4.9% -0.9% -0.5% 0% -0.1%
4 -3.3% -6.1% -1.3% -0.6% -4.9% -0.1%
5 -3.5% -6.2% -1.7% -0.6% -3.7% -0.4%
10 -4.0% -6.4% -3.5% -0.3% 0% -0.9%
15 -4.4% -7.9% -4.8% -0.3% 0% -0.7%
20 -4.7% -8.1% -6.0% 0% 0% -0.6%
50 -5.6% -8.8% -8.9% 0% 0% -0.1%
\Steady -5.6% -9.6% -9.6% 0% 0% 0% State
Notes: (a) The numbers shown in the table are the changes
relative to the 8 percent inflation path in the
absence of tax reform.
(b) The temporary investment tax credit is imposed
in year 4 for 3 years.-53-
much more gradual than that predicted by standard investment
equations. The effect on invesment declines between the
first and second years and then rises steadily as the reduced
capital stock requires less replacement investment.
Since the change considered here is the removal of 9 percent
investment credit, these results indicate a slightly larger
effect than those of Hall and Jorgenson, and a much larger
effect than that found in most other studies.
The right-hand half of the table considers the impact
of a temporary removal of the ITC. Such a measure leads to
a sharp decrease in investment during the suspension period.
This leads to an increase in net investment after the suspension
is removed. Gross investment does not increase because the
lower capital stock requires less replacement investment.
Note that the catch up following the restoration of the credit
is very slow. Two thirds of the gap caused by the suspension
in the capital stock remains 15 years later. These results
show the importance of adjustment costs. In the absence of
any adjustment costs, one would expect to see substantial
disinvestment during the period of the suspension. Because
the adjustment costs of returning to the steady state capital
stock would be high, this does not take place. These sim-
ulations suggest that a countercyclical investment credit
might not be destabilizing. Adjustment costs are sufficiently
large to negate substantial anticipatory effects.-54-
The effects of reductions in the corporate tax rate
are examined in Table 7. An immediate rate reduction from
.48 to .40 is contrasted with an announcement that in year 4,
such a tax cut will take place. Both measures are equivalent
in the long run, and raise the steady state capital stock by
15.7 percent. They increase the long run value of the stock
market significantly more because the reduced corporate tax
raises the effective price of new capital goods by diminishing
the value of accelerated depreciation and the expanding
of adjustment costs.
The simulations show that the announcement policy has
a significantly greater short run impact on investment than
the immediate implementation policy. The former raises the
capital stock by 3 percent after 3 years compared with 2 percent
for the latter. This occurs even though the immediate implemen-
tation policy has a greater immediate impact on the capital
stock. The reason again is the effects of accelerated deprecia-
tion and the expanding of adjustment costs. Firms find it
optimal to accelerate their investment plans to take account
of the lower effective price of capital goods which prevails
before the tax reduction actually takes place. This implies
that if the goal of the corporate rate reduction is to increase
capital formation, the measure should be announced well in
advance of its enactment. Similar considerations suggest
that a temporary increase in the corporate tax rate would
actually spur investment.-55-
TABLE 7










1 +18.6% +7.1% 0% +15.1% +9.5% o %
2 +19.4% +7.2% +0.5% +16.9% +10.8% +0.8%
3 +20.0% +8.5% +1.1% +19.0% +12.2% +1.6%
4 +20.4% +7.3% +1.6% +20.9% + 8.5% +2.5%
5 +20.7% +8.6% +2.0% +21.2% + 8.6% +3.0%
10
I
+22.3% +9.0% +4.5% +22.7% +10.3% +5.1%
15 +23.2% +10.5% +6.5% +23.5% +10.5% +7.0%
I 20 +24.1% +10.8% +8.1% +24.3% +10.8% +8.6%




SteadyI +26.7% +15.3% +15.3% +26.9% +15.3% +15.3% State
I
Notes: (a) Same as Table 6
(b) Tax cut takes place in year 4-56-
The effects of reforms in the individual tax system are
considered in Table 8. Eliminating capital gains taxes would
raise the stock market by 7.3 percent in the short run.
Because it would increase the advantages to the firm of
retaining earnings, the impact on investment is substantially
greater. Its long run effect would be to raise the capital
stock by 29.5 percent. The transition is however very
gradual with only half the adjustment occurring within the
first decade. Comparison of Table 8 with Table 5 suggests
that a significant part of the effect of capital gains taxes
takes place because of inflation.
The second reform considered is an announcem"ent that
in year 4, the dividend tax will be eliminated. This corres-
ponds to an extreme form of partial integration of the corporate
income tax. As explained in Section III, changes in the dividend
tax rate have no effect on steady state capital intensity.
The announcement that a dividend tax reduction will occur
however gives firms a very large incentive to defer paying of
dividends. This is done by accelerating investment. The
simulations suggest that the announcement effect raises invest-
ment by 40.5 percent.-57-
TABLE 8
Reforms in Individual Taxes (a)
CAPITAL GAINS ANTICIPATED (b)
TAX ELIMINATED DIVIDEND RELIEF
Year V I K V I K
1 + 7.3% +11.9% 0% +60.3% +40.5% 0%
2 + 8.1% +12.0% + 0.9% +68.5% +47.0% + 3.2%
3 + 8.5% +13.4% + 1.8% +77.3% +53.7% + 6.7%
4 + 8.9% +12.2% + 2.7% +86.3% + 6.1% +10.7%
5 + 9.3% +13.6% + 3.6% I +85.7% + 6.2% +10.2%
10 +10.8% +16.7% + 7.5% +83. 7% + 5.1% + 8.5%
15 +12.1% +17.1% +11.1% +82.5% + 4.0% + 7.0%
20 +13.2% +20.3% +14.0% +82.0% + 2.7% + 5.7%
50 +16.1% +26.5% +24.0% +79.3% + 1.5% + 1.7%
; Steadyi +17.3% +27.7% +27.7% +78.6% 0 0 , .
; State ,
Notes: (a) Same as 6
(b) Expected abolition of the dividend tax in year 4-58-
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has developed and applied a market
valuation approach to evaluating investment incentives. The
results demonstrate that tax and monetary policies have
large effects on the stock market and investment. The non-
indexed character of our tax system causes inflation to have
strong impact on market valuation and investment. Indeed, it
appears that inflation can account for a large fraction of the
decline in the stock market and investment which occurred
during the 1970's. Reducing the rate of inflation would do
more to increase capital formation than even quite substantial
changes in the tax law. However the results do strongly
suggest that tax policies have quite significant effects on
capital formation. The market valuation approach implies
that the lagged response of investment to tax changes is quite
pronounced. Only half of the response to shocks takes place
within a decade. This may explain why the estimates reported
here imply much larger long run effects of tax policies than
previous studies which have focused on a shorter horizon.
There are several directions in which the analysis in
this paper could be usefully extended. Probably the most..
-59-
important would be placing the model of investment developed
here in a general equilibrium context. Since the corporate
sector represents a substantial fraction of the economy,
measures which affect it will impact on investors' required
rate of return. Feldstein and Summers (1977) estimate that
tax changes which raise the interest rate firms can afford
to pay on given investment projects 1 percent, increase the
actual interest rate by ,25 percent. Summers (1980c) examines
the steady state properties of a general equilibrium model
with three assests, corporate capita~ owner occupied housing
and land. The findings suggest that taking account of general
equilibrium effects would reduce somewhat the partial equili-
brium estimates of tax effects reported here. Appropriate
government monetary policies could be directed at keeping
the required real return constant if it were considered desir-
able to achieve the full partial equilibrium effect of tax changes.
A second important direction for future research is
the implications of uncertainty. A more satisfactory treat-
ment of uncertainty would make it possible to model the deter-
minants of corporate financial policy and the required risk
premium on equity. By introducing a diversification motive,
an explicit treatment of uncertainty would make it possible
to meaningfully model the heterogeneo.us tax rates faced by different
investors. It is difficult to predict how the introduction
of uncertainty would alter the conclusions reached here. The-60-
principal new feature would be a risk sharing effect of
taxation which might tend to encourage investment.
The empirical approach described here is potentially
applicable to a wide variety of problems. Poterba (1980)
has used a similar model to evaluate the impact of inflation
on the market for ~eroccupied housing. The approach could
also be applied to modelling the effects of shocks on invest-
ment in different industries for a different regions. (33)
With some adaptation the market valuation approach could be
used to evaluate a wide variety of shocks, including regulatory
1 . h d . f . ('34) . po ~cy c anges, an ~ements ~n actor pr~ces. Its rel~ance
on observable market valuations and consistancy with rational




Industry "qlt investment equations of the type estimated
by von Furstenberg, Malkiel, and Watson (1980) could
be utilized for this purpose. Summers (1980b) shows
that inflation shocks are likely to have divergent effects
on industry "q"s.
This apprach is being used by Poterba and Summers (1980)
to evaluate the effects of local property tax changes.-61-
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